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In this study, we highlight the influence of the federal system on the develop-
ment expenditure of the states, which is crucial for socio-economic develop-
ment. First, we examine whether there is a convergence in development
expenditure across Malaysian states. Second, we investigate the importance of
decentralization in affecting the pattern of development expenditure in the
short-term and in the long-term. The convergence analysis utilizes annual
growth data from 2000 through 2015 for the short-term and the averages of 3-
and 5-year growth for the long-term. In this study, we employ the panel data
approaches of pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimation proce-
dures. The findings provide empirical evidence of the convergence of develop-
ment expenditure across the states in Malaysia in both the short-term and the
long-term. Generally, all fiscal decentralization indicators (state per capita rev-
enue, state own-source per capita revenue, state own-source revenue as a share
of total revenue and inter-state fiscal capacity) are imperative in influencing
the fiscal behaviour of state governments in Malaysia. These indicators, as well
as assistance from the federal government in the form of transfer payment, are
very much needed to strengthen the expenditure capacity of the Malaysian
states.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Malaysia, which aspires to reach high-income status in
2024, has targeted sustainable and inclusive growth that
is emphasized not only in the economic sector, but also
in terms of social welfare. The Eleventh Malaysia Plan
(11th MP—2016 to 2020) has laid out crucial steps for
Malaysia to follow to become an advanced nation (Eco-
nomic Planning Unit, 2015). The Malaysia Plan high-
lights six thrusts: to enhance inclusiveness for an
equitable society, improve the well-being of the people,
accelerate human capital development, pursue green
growth, strengthen the infrastructure and promote inno-
vation and productivity. According to the Malaysia Plan
report, there has been an increase in socio-economic sta-
tus. It has been observed that the Gini coefficient fell to
0.401 in 2014 from 0.441 in 2009, and that the mean
monthly household income of the bottom 40% of house-
holds increased from RM 1440 in 2009 to RM 2537 in
2014. These are evidences of improvement in overall
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income distribution in Malaysia. The Malaysian Well
Index (MWI), which presents both economic and social
well-being sub composite indices, also improved over
the period from 2000 to 2012, by 25.4 points (Economic
Planning Unit, 2013). Regardless of these develop-
ments, more attention is required to ensure spatial bal-
ance in economic and social well-being across regions,
states or individuals to reflect equity and equality
within a society.
Given the concern over regional imbalances, Malaysia
has focused on regional economic corridors' plans to
address the issues and to ensure that local communities
benefit from development achieved in the region. Despite
these initiatives, more must be done to ensure that devel-
opment gaps across states do not broaden and that the
pattern of socio-economic development is fairly distrib-
uted across the states or local communities. The role of
institutional factors in conducting development policies
and allocating spending in an effective way cannot be
neglected. The country might have similar resources or
spending but different development outcomes due to
other factors such as governance and institutions.
According to the Post-Washington Consensus, different
institutional factors and country-specific organizations
have been major constraints against the achievement of
similar results from policies across states (Kalirajan &
Otsuka, 2012). The difference in state-level effectiveness
lies in the capacities of the different states as well as in
the political and administrative rule. In this context,
one of the major considerations in relation to public
finance and development plans is the presence of
decentralization.
Decentralization or the devolution of political, fiscal
and administrative power from the central to the sub-
national governments may be significant in facilitating
spatially equitable development (Kim, 2008). Socio-
economic indicators are expected to improve with the
provision of local public services, which are theoretically
agreed upon as being more efficiently delivered through
decentralization. Some studies have found that decentral-
ization promotes efficiency in public service (Kim, 2008;
Sow & Razafimahefa, 2015). The function of decentraliza-
tion is delivered effectively if there is a declining
variation in spatial socio-economic development. Never-
theless, due to the different fiscal capacities resulting
from decentralization, states find it challenging to offer
an equitable level of public services (Boadway, 2001).
However, incomparable levels of public services at the
state level are not due only to the revenue-raising capac-
ity but also to the need for, and the costs of provision of,
public services.
Each state is entitled to a similar level of public ser-
vices, which means the population in any area should
have the same access to education and training, health,
crime prevention and other services (Mackay, 2001, as
cited in Gripaios, 2002). Government spending is endoge-
nous to a country's inclusive growth, used to build infra-
structure, human capital and social capital. Spending is
expected to promote improved social and economic
development through the provision of services. Different
levels of government spending on the provision of public
services may reflect different levels of access to public ser-
vices across regions. Faguet and Shami (2008) suggest
that local specific investment is the best way to overcome
the spatial inequality that results from variations in infra-
structure or public assets, while investment in
connectivity-type goods is the best way to foster equality
with respect to differential access to markets, or to a par-
ticular resource (e.g., a natural resource, or knowledge
and information).
Because variation in public services has been a major
cause of spatial imbalance, we seek to examine the pat-
tern of fiscal spending across states on social and eco-
nomic development. We also examine whether the
distribution of development expenditure across developed
and less developed states in Malaysia is likely to be “con-
verging” or “diverging” over time. The Federation of
Malaysia consists of federal and state governments that
are responsible for national development as a whole. In
this context, we attempt to analyze whether decentraliza-
tion indicators and federal transfers affect the develop-
ment expenditure pattern across Malaysian states.
Additionally, we compare the evidence of convergence in
the short-term and the long-term.
We contribute to the growing debate over Malaysian
development in several ways. First, we highlight the
empirical evidence of the equitable distribution of socio-
economic development across states through conver-
gence in government spending. The findings of the study
reflect the fact that less developed states were catching
up to developed states during the period of 2000–2015.
Despite this, the moderate performance of less developed
states in terms of catching up to developed states is better
understood by evaluating the factors that explain changes
in the pattern of government spending across states. In
this regard, we demonstrate that the unresolved issues in
the development gaps across Malaysian states might be a
result of the Malaysian federalism system, which places
financial matters resolutely in federal government
authority. We infer that the functioning of state govern-
ment matters in terms of ensuring spatially equitable
socio-economic development across states in Malaysia.
Moreover, the study on the convergence in develop-
ment expenditure, along with the impact of decentraliza-
tion indicators on the pattern of development
expenditure growth across Malaysian states, have not
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been analyzed before. This provides a motivation for our
study. Prior studies have evidenced that institutional fac-
tors, such as governance and decentralization, could
influence government spending. In the context of other
emerging economies, namely India, Kalirajan and
Otsuka (2012) find that decentralization is important in
cultivating growth in government expenditure across the
states. In addition, Garg (2015) reports that subnational
governments' expenditure across Indian states could be
strengthened through better governance and central gov-
ernment transfers. In this regard, we aim to investigate
whether decentralization plays a role in facilitating
growth in development expenditure, which is crucial to
promoting spatial balance in socio-economic develop-
ment across states in Malaysia.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
The next section discusses federalism and inter-
governmental relationships in Malaysia. It is followed by
reviews of the literature on convergence in state govern-
ment expenditure and a presentation of the data and
methodology. This is followed by the findings, the con-
clusion and the implication of this study.
2 | FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA
The Malaysian Constitution, as a framework for the
country's inter-governmental relationships, governs the
Federation of Malaysia. The Ninth Schedule of the Con-
stitution highlights the legislative powers of the federal
territories and states in Malaysia. Federal and state laws
are split into three categories: federal, state and concur-
rent (both federal and state governments) powers. The
Parliament may create laws for the whole country, or for
any matters on a federal list or the concurrent list, where
the effects of the laws may be both external and within
the federation. The lists show that the federal govern-
ment has legislative authority over the states in most
matters, including social and economic areas such as
trade, commerce and industry, shipping, communication
and transport, education, and medicine and health.
Meanwhile, the state governments deal with Muslim
issues and practices, lands and mines, agriculture and
forestry, local government and public services such as
graveyards, markets and fairs, cinemas and theatre
licences, state government machinery and water, state
holidays, offences and compensation with regard to state
matters, and turtles and river fishing.
Both federal and state governments share responsibili-
ties for social well-being, scholarships, birds and wildlife
conservation, town and country planning, drainage and
irrigation, public health, culture and sports, housing and
water services. Federal government power prevails if there
is an inconsistency between federal and state law. In
Malaysia, the power of the states to pursue their socio-
economic development portfolios of healthcare, education
and infrastructure is limited to federal autonomy, as these
matters are governed by the law set up by the federal gov-
ernment. This implies that the welfare of people across the
states depends greatly on the federal government, though
public service functions may be administered by different
states. Finally, Sabah and Sarawak are granted special con-
stitutional status in both the state list and the concurrent
list, as reflected in the supplementary list in Table 1.
An important feature of Malaysian federalism is the
placing of financial matters firmly in federal government
hands (Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 2009). A state
has limited power to borrow, being allowed to borrow only
directly from the federal government or, when given
approval by the federal government, from a bank or other
financial source for a period not exceeding 5 years. The
Constitution lays out limited powers for the states in terms
of taxation and other sources of revenue, in Article
110 and Part III of the tenth schedule. Almost all kinds of
taxable income are vested to the federal government, while
the state is provided with royalties derived from petro-
leum, export duties on minerals such as tin, ores, metals
and other mineral oils produced in the state, excise duties
on toddy shops, forests, land and mines, and excise duties
on entertainment. Other sources of revenue include rental
charges on state property, licencing fees, charges on water,
and Islamic religious revenue, that is, Zakat, Fitrah and
Baitumal. Despite all these sources of revenue, all the pow-
ers with respect to the taxation of minerals are delivered to
the federal government. In return, the federal government
pays each individual state a portion of the export duties
levied on that state's production. Petroleum revenues are
treated differently from the above; the royalty-sharing
arrangements between the federal and state governments
for offshore oil are counted directly as state government
revenue, and not as a grant from the federal government.
3 | CONVERGENCE IN STATE
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
The past behaviour in terms of expenditure development
across Malaysian state governments can be quantified
based on convergence theory. Barro and Sala-i-Mar-
tin (1990) discuss two definitions of the concept of con-
vergence. First, convergence implies the growth of per
capita income in one economy against the growth of per
capita income across all economies (β-convergence). Con-
versely, the second definition of convergence relates to
the increase or decrease in cross-sectional dispersion
of per capita income over time (σ-convergence).
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The standard neo-classical approach of Solow's (1956)
growth model predicts that absolute convergence hap-
pens, as more developed and capital-abundant countries
experience a diminishing marginal return of capital and
labour. As a result, there is a flow of capital and labour to
less-capital-abundant countries and higher wages, hence
raising the productivity in these countries. All parameters
(e.g., population growth rate, saving rate, production
function) are assumed to be similar so that economies
will have the same steady state in their capital–labour
ratio and income. Moving towards their steady states,
economies with lower values of initial capital–labour
ratio and income (i.e., poor economies) tend to have
higher growth in their capital–labour ratio and also
higher growth in income as compared to economies with
higher initial capital (i.e., rich economies). This condition
implies that there is a convergence of poor countries or
regions towards those with a higher capital–labour ratio
and income.
Conditional convergence is obtained by controlling
the other determinants of the stable state (Kaitila, 2005).
According to this hypothesis, we correct for differences in
the steady states of the capital–labour ratio and income,
or for other structural characteristics, and the conver-
gence occurs as the per capita income in a country moves
towards its long-run growth path. Countries with lower
per capita income are projected to have higher expected
growth. The graphical differences between absolute and
conditional convergence are explained in a study con-
ducted by Timakova (2011). Both concepts state that
countries will converge to one identical point. Hence, the
results of convergence can be observed after controlling
the structural differences in the economy, as represented
by the negative relationship between the initial
level of income per capita and subsequent growth
(Timakova, 2011).
Besides indicating income, the previous literature has
investigated the degree of convergence in the area of pub-
lic finance (Afxentiou & Serletis, 1996; Annala, 2003;
Apergis, Christou, & Hassapis, 2013; Deller &
Skidmore, 2005; Pan, Wang, Qin, & Zhang, 2013;
Skidmore, Toya, & Merriman, 2004). Earlier work by
TABLE 1 Distribution of legislative powers between Federation and states




4. Civil and criminal law and justice
legal system
5. Nationality and citizenship
6. Machinery of federal government
7. Finance
8. Trade, industry and commerce
9. Shipping, navigation and fisheries
10. Communication and transport
11. Federal works and control
12. Surveys, inquiries and research
13. Education
14. Medicine and health
15. Labour and society protection
16. Aborigines' welfare
17. Licencing the professional
18. Federal holidays
19. Unincorporated societies
20. The control of agriculture pests
21. Publications
22. Censorship
23. Theatres and cinemas




1. Muslims' issues and practices
2. Land
3. Agriculture and forestry
4. Local government
5. Local facilities - lodging houses,
graveyards, pounds and cattle
trespassing, markets and fairs, and
theatres and cinema licences
6. Machinery of state government
7. State controls and water
8. State holidays
9. State purposes inquiries
10. Offences and compensation in
regard to state matters
11. Turtles and river fishing
Supplement to state list for the states of
Sabah and Sarawak
1. Native law and customs
2. Incorporation of state authorities and
other organizations
3. Ports and harbours not included in
federal control
4. Cadastral surveying
5. Museum and library
6. The Sabah railway in Sabah
1. Social well-being
2. Scholarship
3. Birds and wildlife conservation
4. Animal husbandry
5. Town and country planning
6. Vagrancy law and licencing of
itinerant hawkers
7. Public health
8. Irrigation and drainage
9. Mine and land rehabilitation
10. Fire safety measures
11. Culture and sports
12. Housing and accommodation
provisions
Supplement to state list for the states of
Sabah and Sarawak
1. Personal law
2. Adulterated food and other goods
3. Below 15 tons shipping
4. Water power
5. Research in agriculture and forestry
6. Charities and charitable trusts
7. Theatres, cinemas and places for
entertainment
Note: This table shows the subject matter of the federal and state laws, which are split into three categories: federal, state and concurrent
(both federal and state governments) powers.
Source: The Constitution of Malaysia, as cited in Anuar (2000).
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Annala (2003) adds three assumptions to explain conver-
gence in government activity. These assumptions are
(1) population growth is exogeneous, (2) the population
and labour force are the same and (3) the tax imposed is
a fixed proportion of output. Given a tax that is a con-
stant proportion of output, the growth rate of the tax will
equal the growth rate of output. Additionally, as taxes are
used to finance government spending, the growth rate of
government activity will equal both the growth rate of
taxes and the growth rate of output. Applying the same
concept of convergence as Solow (1956), Annala (2003)
assumes that convergence of income or output is also
related to convergence of taxes and government activity.
The study tests for convergence in US fiscal policies in
the areas of total taxes and three divisions of tax revenue
(property, general sales and income tax), as well as five
categories of local government expenditure (general, edu-
cation, highways, welfare and hospital expenditure). The
study reports some findings on convergence in those
fiscal policies. Skidmore, Toya, and Merriman (2004) dis-
cuss the convergence in government expenditure on the
basis of a theoretical model. The study shows that
the level of government spending (Gt) is a function of the
share (τt) of previous output (Qt − 1). On the other hand,
per capita output, qt is given as a function of private capi-
tal (kt) and public inputs ( gt). From these two functions,
this study formulates the approximate production func-
tion with Cobb–Douglas constant returns to scale, as
below:
Gt  τtALt−1kαt−1gβ t−1 ð1Þ
From Equation (1), growth in per capita government





≈lnAτt−nt + αlnkt−1 + β−1ð Þlngt−1 ð2Þ
Based on Equation (2), government spending is speci-
fied as a function of lagged values of private (kt − 1) and
public (gt − 1) capitals, growth of the population (nt) and
its share of the total output (τt). Similar to private capital,
government spending experiences diminishing marginal
returns (β < 1). Therefore, with other variables held con-
stant, the higher level of initial government expenditure
is associated with lower growth in current government
expenditure, and vice versa for a lower level of spending.
Hence, there will be convergence in government expendi-
ture over time.
This situation supports the convergence hypothesis as
previously discussed. Skidmore et al. (2004) add that con-
vergence happens due to the diminishing of marginal
utility in consuming each additional unit of government
goods and services. It is argued that the marginal benefit
obtained from extra government spending is higher for
citizens of countries with a low initial level of govern-
ment spending than for those with a high level of govern-
ment spending. As a result, countries with the former
condition will increase their spending, hence experienc-
ing very high growth rates that will allow them to catch
up to countries with high initial levels of government
spending.
Previous studies on convergence in government
expenditure have focused on different categories of fiscal
policies and expenditure, and they have reported mixed
results (convergence: Zhang, Zhang, Wu, Xia, & Lu, 2016
and Pan, Wang, Qin, & Zhang, 2013 (government health
expenditure); Garg, 2015 (education, health and develop-
ment expenditure); Annala, 2003 (tax revenue, highway,
education and general expenditure); Deller &
Skidmore, 2005 (protection services, road, waste services
and quality of life services expenditure); Skidmore
et al., 2004 (consumption, capital and education expendi-
ture); divergence: Pan et al., 2013 (government health
expenditure); Annala, 2003 (public welfare and health
expenditure); Apergis, Christou, & Hassapis, 2013 (public
expenditure); Afxentiou & Serletis, 1996 (subsidies)).
Along with convergence analysis, the literature has
examined the impact of institutional factors on changes
in government spending. A recent study by Garg (2015)
includes governance and some categories of federal trans-
fers as determinants of growth in government expendi-
ture across Indian states. The study finds that better
governance and transfers from the central government
have strengthened the subnational governments' capacity
to cultivate expenditure growth across states. In addition,
Kalirajan and Otsuka (2012) use a decentralization index
to determine the influence of the devolution of resources
from the central government, and that of the state capac-
ity to collect revenue, on tendencies in government
spending. The study shows that a greater level of decen-
tralization facilitates higher growth in government
expenditure. In this study, we include decentralization
indicators as well as federal transfers to examine their
impact on the spatial equity pattern of Malaysian state
governments' development expenditure. To the best of
our knowledge, this study is the first to quantify the
impact of decentralization indicators on the pattern of
expenditure growth in the context of Malaysia.
Figure 1 depicts the pattern of inter-state differences
in the growth of development expenditure between devel-
oped and less developed states for the three 5-year
periods of 2001–2005, 2005–2010 and 2011–2015. Overall,
the figure depicts the convergence of less developed states
to developed states, in terms of their development expen-
diture, in some phases. Initially, the growth rate of
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development expenditure in the developed states was
higher than that of the less developed states. However, less
developed states improved from 2002 to 2007, and again
after 2009, when the higher expenditure growth in the less
developed states was accompanied by a decline in the
growth of expenditure in the developed states. From the
year 2011 onwards, it has become evident that the less
developed states are catching up to the developed states at
a faster rate, with increasing growth rates of development
expenditure. Following 2014, there has been an upward
trend in the growth of development expenditure for both
developed and less developed states. Further convergence
analysis will be carried out using a regression framework
on the convergence model, based on Barro and Sala-i-Mar-
tin's (1990) work, to reveal whether the development
expenditure across Malaysian states is likely to be “con-
verging” or “diverging” over time.
4 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The Federation of Malaysia consists of 3 federal terri-
tories and 13 state governments. As the three federal ter-
ritories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya are
administered by the federal government, we look at the
13 state governments, namely, Johor, Melaka, Negeri
Sembilan, Pulau Pinang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor, Kedah,
Kelantan, Pahang, Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak, over
the period from 2000 to 2015. We retrieve data on expen-
diture and revenue from the yearly financial statements
of state governments from the National Audit Depart-
ment website. The data on transfers from the federal gov-
ernment are supplied by the Ministry of Finance, while
state per capita GDPs (GSDP) and state-level populations
are retrieved from the Economic Planning Unit, Prime
Minister's Department. We use linear interpolation to
obtain missing data on the GSDP for the years 2001, 2002
and 2004. We deflate expenditure, revenue and transfer
variables using the consumer price index of 2010 as the
base year, to obtain the values in real prices. GSDP is also
at constant 2010 prices.
4.1 | Model and specifications
We analyze the disparity in state government expenditure
based on the concept of the convergence model. As our
study is interested in fiscal expenditure convergence in
the Malaysian states, we use the β-convergence model to
reveal the growth rate of poor economies in catching up
with rich economies. The β-convergence describes the
speed of convergence between states with lower per
capita expenditure and those with higher spending per
capita. We further examine the model based on two types
of convergence: unconditional and conditional. Uncondi-
tional convergence is obtained by regressing the growth
of real government expenditure only at its initial level.
Meanwhile, conditional convergence refers to a condition
in which a negative relationship exists between the initial
level of government spending and its average growth rate
after explanatory variables are controlled. We include
revenue decentralization instruments to study the impor-
tance of institutional factors and other possible determi-
nants that might affect the convergence of state
governments' expenditure in Malaysia. This study's con-
ditional convergence equation is an extension of Barro
and Sala-i-Martin's (1990) methodology of income con-
vergence as defined below:
FIGURE 1 Growth rate of development expenditure between
developed and less developed states. This figure depicts the pattern
of inter-state differences in the growth of development expenditure
between developed and less developed states for the three 5-year
periods of 2001–2005, 2005–2010 and 2011–2015. Source: Author's
calculation [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]




= α+ β0lnY it−1 + + β1 Decitð Þ+ β1 Xitð Þ+ εi,t ð3Þ
where Yit refers to current per capita real expenditure
of state “i,” while Yit − 1 denotes the initial level of per
capita expenditure. The estimated coefficient of Yit − 1 is
expected to have a negative indication, implying the con-
vergence of development expenditure across states. Next,
variable revenue decentralization (Dec) is included to
measure the impact of the fiscal autonomy of state gov-
ernments on the development expenditure pattern. We
postulate a positive sign for the estimated coefficient,
which would infer that a state with more revenue has
more fiscal capacity and, hence, higher expenditure than
a state with lower revenue. On the other hand, Xit refers
to the control variables of initial per capita GSDP and
population growth of individual state “i” in particular
year “t.”
With regard to revenue decentralization indicators,
we employ total state revenue in the first model but, in
the remaining three models, split the total revenue into
transfers from the federal government and the fiscal
capacity of the states. The inclusion of federal transfers
helps us understand the level at which state governments
rely on the federal government's assistance in making
their development expenditure decisions. Meanwhile, the
state's fiscal capacity is proxied by three different mea-
sures. The total state revenue at the per capita level is
used in the second model while state own-source revenue
as a share of total state revenue is used in the third
model. In the fourth model, we use state own-source rev-
enue as a share of the national average, where the
national average is the total of all the state revenue
divided by the number of states. While the first two mea-
sures describe the revenue capacity in a particular state,
the third captures the inter-state difference in fiscal
capacity in meeting expenditure responsibilities. Based
on Wilson's (1996) work, state own-source revenue as a
share of the national average is used to explain the hori-
zontal balance across states, which in turn reveals the
variation in the amount of per capita own-source revenue
available to each state out of the national average.
Initial per capita GSDP and population growth are
included as the control variables. Guided by Wagner's
Law, public economy is affected by the nation's demand
and willingness to pay for services where the income
elasticity of demand for public services is elastic
(Cameron, 1978). It is postulated that state governments
will expand their expenditure if they have a greater level
of income. Population growth is incorporated to capture
the impact that demographics have on the state govern-
ment's spending. In addition, the government is responsi-
ble for ensuring the provision of adequate public goods
and services, and for sustaining the quality of life of local
people who may be affected by the size of the subnational
jurisdiction, which can be measured based on the size of
the population (De Mello Jr, 2002). In this context, the
greater the population, the larger the size of the sub-
national jurisdiction. It is assumed that states with higher
population growth will bear higher costs of public service
provision. This may cause state governments to allocate
more spending to benefit all the people in terms of socio-
economic development. From another viewpoint, an
increase in population would increase the tax base, giving
more revenue to the state governments so that they can
fulfil their expenditure responsibilities (Goudswaard &
Van de Kar, 1994). All the variables are transformed into
logarithms except for the state-sourced revenue as a share
of total public sector revenue and the state-sourced reve-
nue as a share of the national average.
4.2 | Regression framework
By means of this analysis, we aim to determine whether
the pattern of development expenditure across Malaysian
states is affected by similar or different mechanisms of
institutional factors during the short-term and the long-
term. The key variables of interest in our study are fed-
eral transfers, total state revenue, state own-source reve-
nue and inter-state differences in fiscal capacity. The
convergence in development expenditure across states is
analyzed based on annual growth for the short-term, and
average 3-year and 5-year growth for the long-term. Our
study consists of balanced panel data for 13 states from
2000 to 2015. We employ the panel data approaches of
pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects.
First, we perform the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multi-
plier test for random effects. The chi-bar-square statistic
reveals that the null hypothesis of consistency in the
pooled OLS is rejected. Therefore, random effects estima-
tion is preferred to pool OLS. Next, we evaluate the joint
significance of state-specific fixed effects based on an F-
test. Again, the null hypothesis of the absence of specific
effects is rejected. Hence, we proceed with fixed effects
instead of pooled OLS estimation. In choosing an appro-
priate model, we use the Hausman test to decide between
fixed effects and random effects. The test supports the
rejection of the null hypothesis of using the random
effects model in all conditional and unconditional con-
vergence analyses except for the case of unconditional
convergence during the short-term. Therefore, the fixed
effects model is deemed reliable for explaining the fiscal
behaviour of state governments in Malaysia. Further-
more, the fixed effects model has controlled time-
invariant variables, such as regional factors and
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individual state governments, which may have an impact
on the estimation results. In addition, we cluster the state
governments in obtaining robust standard errors, and
control the time effect and correct for heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation using robust standard errors. The
diagnostic test reveals that the model is free of the
multicollinearity problem, as the variance inflation factor
(VIF) for each variable is less than 10. Wooldridge (2013)
reports that the value 10 is chosen as the cut-off value for
VIFs. A multicollinearity problem exists if a VIF value is
above 10 (p. 94). The Hausman test results and VIF
scores are reported in the results tables in the following
subheading.
5 | FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
We first discuss the results for unconditional conver-
gence, followed by those for conditional convergence.
Table 2 shows the result for unconditional convergence
in real government development expenditure across
states in Malaysia. The Hausman test supports the rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis of using the random effects
model in all unconditional convergence analyses except
for the case of annual growth. In this regard, we report
the results of random effects estimation for the short-
term (annual growth) but fixed effects estimation for both
long-term (3-year average and 5-year average) growths.
Based on Table 2, the significant negative coefficient of
initial expenditure implies a decrease in the inter-state
disparity in state government development expenditure
over the period of 2000–2015. The coefficient of β1 shows
that the rate of convergence of government development
expenditure across Malaysian states is higher in the long-
term than in the short-term. The results imply that the
convergence of states with lower initial development
expenditure to those with higher initial development
expenditure is more likely to occur within 3 and 5 years
than 1 year. Statistically, a negative beta coefficient indi-
cates that the lower the initial expenditure, the higher
the growth of government expenditure towards the stable
state. In other words, economies converge in terms of real
government development expenditure at a speed of 0.06
percentage points per year and 0.3 and 0.23 percentage
points on average over 3 and 5 years, respectively.
Next, the results for conditional convergence in real
per capita development expenditure are provided in
Tables 3–5 for annual, 3-year average and 5-year average
periods, respectively. The Hausman tests reveal that the
null hypothesis of using the random effects is rejected in
all conditional convergence analyses. Therefore, the dis-
cussion of the conditional convergence is based on fixed
effects estimation results, which have been reported in
Tables 3–5. For the whole analysis, the coefficient of β1 in
all models supports the idea that there is a convergence
in development expenditure among Malaysian states dur-
ing the period of 2000–2015. The speed of convergence is
higher in the conditional models than it is in the uncon-
ditional model. However, the results show that the speed
of convergence in the short-term is higher than it is in
the long-term when we compare annual and average
3-year and 5-year growth analysis. This finding is con-
tradicted by the earlier discussion of unconditional con-
vergence results, which suggests that evidence of
convergence is higher on average over 3 years than over
1. Additionally, there is evidence of convergence on aver-
age over 5 years, although the speed of convergence is
lowest over this period. The speed of convergence lies
between 0.44 and 0.53 points annually, as compared to
between 0.44 and 0.48 points per year over 3 years. Mean-
while, the convergence rate is between 0.27 and 0.28
points in the case of a 5-year interval.
The conditional convergence in state government
development expenditure in Malaysia shows a similar
trend to what has taken place in other developing
TABLE 2 Absolute or unconditional convergence: 2000
to 2015











































Note: This table shows the results for unconditional convergence in
real government development expenditure across states in Malay-
sia. Numbers in round and square brackets indicate robust standard
errors and p-values, respectively. ***, ** and * denote statistical sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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countries. Based on a 3-year average, a previous study by
Kalirajan and Otsuka (2012) provides evidence of conver-
gence in several categories of development expenditure
in India at a rate of between 0.20 and 0.26 points. At lon-
ger than a 3-year interval, Kalirajan, Bhide, and
Singh (2009) find that the convergence in development
expenditure in India is slow, at a rate of 0.13 to 0.21
points. On the other hand, the latest research by
Garg (2015) shows that annual growth in development
expenditure in India converges at a rate of 0.33 to 0.46
points. These three studies support the consistent impli-
cation of our findings that the speed of convergence in
development expenditure in a developing country such as
Malaysia is faster within a short interval than it is over a
longer interval. The findings of our study are also in line
with Skidmore et al. (2004), who show empirical support
for convergence in government consumption as well as
capital and education spending in developing countries.
Based on a 5-year interval, their convergence rate was
slow, ranging from 0.02 to 0.1 points.
Based on the findings, we also show state government
characteristics that are significant to the spatial equity in
overall socio-economic development through the pattern
of the expenditure. Beginning with model 1, the results
illustrate the importance of total state revenue to the
growth rate of development expenditure as displayed in
Tables 3–5. The positive beta coefficient implies that the
increase in state revenue will increase the growth in gov-
ernment spending, with the impact highest over 1 year,
followed by the average over the 3-year and 5-year periods.
Based on model 2, it is suggested that state own-source
revenue is an important source of the growth in govern-
ment spending across all states. A one-point increase in
the level of state own-source per capita revenue induces a
higher growth in inter-state development expenditure of
approximately 0.4 points over 1 year and on average over
3 years. However, the impact of state own-source revenue
on the growth of expenditure is nearly half of those 0.4
points on average over a longer period of 5 years. Further-
more, the influence of the level of per capita transfers from
TABLE 3 Conditional convergence in government development expenditure (annual growth)
Growth in development expenditure Model 1 VIF Model 2 VIF Model 3 VIF Model 4 VIF
Initial development expenditure −0.5382*** 3.5 −0.537*** 3.3 −0.4484*** 2.1 −0.4843*** 3.7
(0.0619) (0.0823) (0.0873) (0.0855)
Initial GSDP −0.6384* 1.2 −0.7002 1.4 −0.9323 1.5 −0.496 1.3
(0.3633) (0.4706) (0.6342) (0.5252)
Total state revenue 0.5767*** 3.8
(0.1401)
Federal transfers 0.1498 2.3 0.3299** 4.5 0.1328 2.3
(0.1079) (0.1462) (0.1119)
State-sourced revenue 0.4185*** 3.7
(0.1393)
State-sourced revenue as share of total 0.0132*** 3.8
(0.0041)
Inter-state fiscal capacity 0.0031*** 3.3
(0.0009)
Population growth −0.0205 1.2 −0.0183 1.4 −0.0001 1.3 −0.0085 1.3
(0.0453) (0.0427) (0.0474) (0.0531)
Constant 5.7685 6.805 9.1242 6.4413
(3.9986) (5.01) (6.3498) (5.5645)
(control year)
Observation 195 195 195 195
R-squared (within) 0.42 0.3915 0.3475 0.3597
Hausman test: Chi-sq statistics 39.82*** 39.04*** 36.94*** 26.92*
Note: This table shows the results for conditional convergence in real per capita development expenditure (annual growth). Numbers in
brackets indicate robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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the federal government on the pattern of state expenditure
in Malaysia can be realized only over 3 years and no lon-
ger than that. These results imply that the level of state
own-source per capita revenue has been a major factor in
the growth in government expenditure, despite the level of
per capita transfers from the federal government, which
has a smaller influence on the change in government
expenditure. In addition, the level of per capita transfers
from the federal government is insufficient to promote
short-term convergence in the growth of expenditure
among states in Malaysia.
Similarly, in model 3, the results show that as state
own-source revenue constitutes a higher share of the total
revenue, higher growth is encouraged in government
expenditure. Overall, a one-point increase in state own-
source revenue as a share of total revenue will escalate
growth in government expenditure by over one point
within 1 year and on average per year over 3 years but by
less than one point on average per year over 5 years. Mean-
while, the level of per capita transfers from the federal gov-
ernment has a significant effect on the pattern of
expenditure growth for Malaysian states, not just in the
long-term but also in the short-term. A similar result is
found as for model 2, with the level of per capita transfers
having a greater effect on expenditure over 1 and 3 years,
on average, than over 5. The results from model 2 and
model 3 show evidence of state government reliance on
federal transfers in generating their development spending.
Model 4 includes state own-source revenue as a share
of the national average, to examine whether differences
in inter-state fiscal capacity affect the spending decisions
of Malaysian states. As expected, the higher the fiscal
capacity of particular state governments relative to the
average, the higher the growth in government spending
in that state. A one-point increase causes growth in gov-
ernment expenditure to increase by 0.3, 0.28 and 0.13
points per year over 1, 3 and 5 years, respectively. The
impact of inter-state fiscal capacity on expenditure
growth is smaller in the long-term than in the short-term.
This result implies that relative fiscal capacity induces
greater expenditure competition among Malaysian states
over a short period than over a longer period.
TABLE 4 Conditional convergence in government development expenditure (3-year average growth)
Growth in development expenditure Model 1 VIF Model 2 VIF Model 3 VIF Model 4 VIF
Initial development expenditure −0.4467*** 3.1 −0.4854*** 3.2 −0.4434*** 2.3 −0.4722*** 3.6
(0.0447) (0.0483) (0.0555) (0.0448)
Initial GSDP −0.343*** 1.1 −0.3950*** 1.4 −0.6685** 1.5 −0.4464*** 1.3
(0.1254) (0.1245) (0.2636) (0.1308)
Total state revenue 0.4532*** 3.4
(0.0627)
Federal transfers 0.1347** 2.9 0.3279** 4.9 0.0927 2.9
(0.0707) (0.1541) (0.0739)
State-sourced revenue 0.4049*** 3.5 3.5
(0.0674)
State-sourced revenue as share of total 0.0142***
(0.005)
Inter-state fiscal capacity 0.0028*** 3.2
(0.0005)
Population growth 0.0219 1.2 0.0145 1.5 0.0543 1.5 0.0354 1.4
(0.0439) (0.0416) (0.0401) (0.0533)
Constant 3.0431 3.6314 6.3535 6.0502
(1.4357) (1.58) (2.6708) (1.5556)
(control year)
Observation 65 65 65 65
R-squared (within) 0.823 0.8221 0.7402 0.7777
Hausman test: Chi-sq statistics 188.21*** 114.55*** 50.07*** 43.76*
Note: This table shows the results for conditional convergence in real per capita development expenditure (3-year average growth). Numbers
in brackets indicate robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
10 YUSOF ET AL.
Overall, the results indicate that all decentralization
indicators that are measured based on per capita state
revenue, state own-source per capita revenue, state
own-source revenue as a share of total revenue, state
own-source capacity as a share of the national average
and per capita federal transfers are imperative in affect-
ing spatial equitability in socio-economic development
through the pattern of the development expenditure of
the states in Malaysia. The significant positive influence
of state revenue on government expenditure is consis-
tent with the previous findings of Zhang, Zhang, Wu,
Xia, and Lu (2016) and Kalirajan and Otsuka (2012).
Other previous empirical works (Abdul Jalil & Abdul
Karim, 2008; Garg, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016) also sup-
port the relevance of federal transfers to the increase in
state spending.
As for the other control variables, the estimates indi-
cate that initial state per capita income measured by GDP
(GSDP) has a significant negative effect on the growth of
development expenditure across states in Malaysia.
Though Wagner's Law contradicts the negative effect of
initial GSDP on the growth of development expenditure,
the negative sign of the coefficient can be linked to the
previous study of Abdul Jalil and Abdul Karim (2008),
which found a negative relationship between a state's ini-
tial GDP and tax efficiency. Wagner assumes that growth
of national income is vital for public spending, basically
arguing that public sectors will grow as per capita income
increases (Wagner, 1883). The study by Abdul Jalil and
Abdul Karim (2008) shows that an increase in state per
capita income reduces tax efficiency. This result implies
that the negative effect of initial per capita income on
growth in government spending happens because of tax
inefficiency. In other interpretations, the negative coeffi-
cient of initial GSDP in relation to the growth in develop-
ment expenditure also implies that an increase in GSDP
will increase government development expenditure at a
decreasing rate. Meanwhile, population growth is not sig-
nificant in affecting the growth in development expendi-
ture of states in Malaysia.
TABLE 5 Conditional convergence in government development expenditure (5-year average growth)
Growth in development expenditure Model 1 VIF Model 2 VIF Model 3 VIF Model 4 VIF
Initial development expenditure −0.2701*** 2.6 −0.2729*** 2.3 −0.2828*** 2.1 −0.288*** 3.3
(0.0147) (0.0222) (0.0326) (0.0209)
Initial GSDP −0.165** 1.2 −0.1798 1.3 −0.3237** 1.5 −0.1366 1.3
(0.0918) (0.1061) (0.1237) (0.1585)
Total state revenue 0.2291*** 2.8
(0.0577)
Federal transfers 0.1184 1.9 0.2504*** 4.3 0.076 2.7
(0.0744) (0.0909) (0.0817)
State-sourced revenue 0.189*** 2.7
(0.0509)
State-sourced revenue as share of total 0.0094** 3.4
(0.0039)
Inter-state fiscal capacity 0.0013*** 2.9
(0.0004)
Population growth −0.0246 1.2 −0.0123 1.5 0.0149 1.5 0.0124 1.5
(0.032) (0.0372) (0.0325) (0.0491)
Constant 1.711 1.6457 2.8435 2.2929
(1.2016) (1.3352) (1.5802) (1.649)
(control year)
Observation 39 39 39 39
R-squared (within) 0.8617 0.8676 0.8577 0.8306
Hausman test: Chi-sq statistics 153.61*** 189.54*** 153.56*** 243.34*
Note: This table shows the results for conditional convergence in real per capita development expenditure (annual growth). Numbers in
brackets indicate robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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6 | CONCLUSION AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the importance of government spending with
respect to the variation observed in public services, we
have examined the pattern of state government expendi-
ture to determine whether there is a convergence in
development expenditure and whether fiscal decentrali-
zation across states in Malaysia is functioning effectively.
We have also analyzed the impact of the institutional fac-
tors of state government and federal government
resources on changes in the fiscal behaviour of state gov-
ernments. Generally, we find that state governments in
Malaysia have fostered equitable spatial development
through convergence in development expenditure. The
rate of unconditional convergence is faster per year over
durations of 3 and 5 years as compared to a 1-year period.
However, the estimation results reveal that convergence
has occurred more over 1 year than over 3 years when
the impact of other factors, such as decentralization indi-
cators, initial GSDP and state population growth, are con-
sidered. Evidence of convergence is also found over a
longer period of 5 years, although the yearly convergence
rate is slower in the shorter timeframes.
By and large, we find that total state revenue per
capita, state own-source per capita revenue, state own-
source revenue as a share of total revenue and state own-
source capacity as a share of the national average have
positive effects on the fiscal behaviour of state govern-
ments in Malaysia. Also, the level of per capita transfers
from the federal government is vital to strengthening the
expenditure capacity of the Malaysian states. These find-
ings support the idea that the functioning of state
government matters for ensuring spatially equitable
socio-economic development in the aspect of public
finance. The effectiveness of the state governments at col-
lecting revenue and managing the distribution of
resources is vital to the process of development across
states in Malaysia. Furthermore, these findings confirm
that institutional factors play an important role in
explaining the variation in growth or overall develop-
ment across states in Malaysia resulting from the devel-
opment expenditure of the states. Though the study does
not explicitly explain the reasons for the persistent lag in
the performance of less developed states, understanding
the factors that affect the fiscal behaviour of the states
might reduce this gap. In this context, maintaining less
variation in state per capita revenue, state own-source
per capita revenue, state own-source revenue as a share
of total revenue and inter-state fiscal capacity might
reduce the dispersion. Additionally, the government
should take into account a further decentralization in the
aspect of public finance because the state government
has limited involvement in resource allocation and social
and economic planning that has challenged the positive
outcomes of decentralization. Furthermore, the federal
government of Malaysia, through the transfer mecha-
nism, should pay more attention to less developed states,
as state own-source revenue in most of these states is
insufficient for cultivating growth in their fiscal pattern
of development expenditure, as shown in Figures 2 and
3. On the contrary, developed states have better fiscal
capacity in terms of their own-source revenue, which is
more adequate for their development expenditure com-
pared to the less developed states.
FIGURE 2 Horizontal balance among developed states. Note:
This figure shows state own-source revenue as a share of total state
revenue of developed states: Johor, Melaka, Perak, Pulau Pinang,
Negeri Sembilan and Selangor. All developed states earned own-
source revenue that was nearly 80% of their total state revenue.
Source: Author's calculation [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 3 Horizontal balance among less developed states.
Note: This figure shows state own-source revenue as a share of total
state revenue of less developed states: Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis,
Pahang, Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak. All less developed states
except oil-revenue states (Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak) earned
own-source revenue that was lower than 80% of their total state
revenue. Source: Author's calculation [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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